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1 Here is a valuable but also complex book. In fact, the reply to the question posed in the
title  cannot  be  taken  for  granted.  The  good  news  is  that  democracy  is  now  well
accepted in East Asia, and it is no longer possible to argue that there is any cultural
allergy to this concept or this project. The bad news is that the political culture that
underlies  democracy  is  still  fragile  and  vague  in  East  Asia,  allowing  the  Chinese
authorities,  for  example,  to  enjoy  the  apparent  support  of  the  majority  of  their
population in maintaining and consolidating a system that is “democratic” in name
only.
2 The first comparative study of its type on East Asia, this volume is based on opinion
polls conducted between June 2001 and February 2003 in six democracies (South Korea,
Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand), one semi-democracy (Hong
Kong),  and  one  authoritarian  country  (China).  The  same  questions  were  posed  to
significant representative samples, including in China, with only a few exceptions.
3 The  results  of  these  surveys  are  impressive.  All  of  the  societies  studied  regard
democracy in a positive light. In a great majority of cases, democracy is not associated
with chaos, corruption, violence, or inefficiency, but rather with fundamental freedoms
and rights, with free elections and representative institutions, and with the concepts of
social justice, good governance, welfare, and “government by the people and for the
people.” It is also interesting to note that in these societies democracy is generally not
linked  to  the  market  economy  or  private  property,  in  contrast,  for  example,  to
post-1989 Eastern Europe; it is rather understood as a mix both of liberal and populist
political ideas and of (vague) principles of participation (pp. 17-18).
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4 The surveys conducted of course go beyond and qualify these general points. First of
all,  four fifths of the people questioned (with the exception of Mongolia, where the
figure is 70 percent) feel they are capable neither of understanding nor of participating
in political affairs. However, more than two thirds of them describe as dictatorial the
regime that  preceded the  one  currently  in  power  (for  example,  Japan before  1945,
China  before  1979,  other  countries  before  their  democratisation),  except  for
respondents  in  Hong  Kong  who,  for  reasons  that  are  easy  to  understand,  see  a
regression in the evolution after 1997. And logically, with the exception of Hong Kong
again, the people surveyed regard the present political system as “relatively or very
democratic,”  including  the  Chinese  (84  percent),  whose  optimism  results  from  the
addition of freedoms and improvement in the standard of living after the death of Mao
Zedong. It has to be added that nearly half of the respondents in China perceive only a
“moderate evolution towards democracy” in the current situation (see below).
5 Probably  more  important,  support  for  democracy  in  East  Asia  (except  in  Thailand)
remains dependent on the political and economic performance of the government in
place. This dependence exceeds not only that in southern Europe (Spain), but also in
sub-Saharan Africa and even Latin America. Nevertheless, more than two thirds of the
people surveyed reject any return to an authoritarian regime (strongman, one-party
state, military dictatorship, and technocracy),  including in China, although only the
last two questions could be included in the survey there (military regime and “experts
decide everything”).
6 Another essential question is the relationship between democracy and the rule of law.
In the six democracies and in Hong Kong, this relationship is generally close: those who
think that their government should not overstep the law are very numerous (South
Korea: 77 percent; Hong Kong: 70 percent; Taiwan: 58 percent; and in Thailand, where
populist  tendencies  are  more  apparent,  49  percent;  the  question  was  not  asked  in
China).  The  principle  of  judicial  independence,  on  the  other  hand,  is  less  soundly
anchored: well accepted in South Korea (69 percent), Japan (62 percent), and to a lesser
degree in Taiwan (54 percent), it is only upheld by a minority of Filipinos (39 percent),
Thais (40 percent), and Chinese (31 percent). Similarly, parliament, often unpopular in
East Asia, is only clearly regarded as a useful counter-power to the executive by South
Koreans (54 percent) and Japanese (50 percent). Only 47 percent of Hong Kong citizens
and Thais, 34 percent of Chinese, and 25 percent of Taiwanese think this is the case.
7 Finally, these societies are on the whole both optimistic and realistic about the future:
the Chinese, Mongolians, and Thais more so than the South Koreans, Taiwanese, Hong
Kongers,  and Japanese.  These trends result  from the conclusions that each of these
societies  has  drawn regarding  its  current  regime,  its  political  performance,  and  in
particular its ability to combat corruption.
8 Overall, this work reveals how the problems faced by the political regimes of East Asia
are shared by other regions of the world: the new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin
America, and Africa, but also, to a certain degree and for different reasons, Russia and
India.
9 It is impossible, in this short review, to do justice to the richness of the data compiled
and  of  the  conclusions  proposed.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  mention  some
reservations on the method and some of its unintended consequences. First of all, this
is a snapshot, a still photograph, of the state of political culture in six Asian societies
that are certainly dependent on the global context (the third wave of democratisation,
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then its ebb), but that are also evolving according to specific national trajectories. The
democratic  confidence  of  the  Thais  or  the  optimism of  the  Chinese  can  only  raise
doubts in the reader's mind regarding the impact of these opinions on the regimes
being studied. As the authors admit, other factors weigh more heavily: in Thailand, the
weak  inclination  of the  elite  for  democracy,  in  China,  a  political  conditioning
successfully implemented by the Communist Party.
10 Similarly, if the moment chosen is necessarily arbitrary, it has considerable influence
on the responses received. Thus one can wonder about the degree of “nostalgia” among
the Taiwanese for the authoritarian regime of the Chiang family. It is true that in 2001
the popularity of Chen Shui-bian was very low (although it experienced an even more
dramatic  drop  after  his  disputed  re-election  in  2004).  However,  to  write  that
“authoritarianism remains a formidable potential competitor to democracy” (p. 108)
seems exaggerated: indeed, neither Taiwanese society nor above all its elite seriously
envisage  a  reappraisal  of  the  democratic  consensus,  all  the  less  so  in  view  of  the
challenge represented by the rising power of authoritarian mainland China.
11 When feasible,  developments  that  occurred after  the  surveys  were  conducted  have
been included to qualify some seemingly incoherent results. But the authors can only
be encouraged to repeat the surveys at regular intervals. That would provide a more
dynamic  and probably  more accurate  representation of  the  perceptions  and trends
examined.
12 I would like to finish with a thought on the case of China that I raised above. One can
only salute the work carried out by Tianjian Shi, which is ground-breaking in many
respects. But he leaves in a state of perplexity and pessimism all those who believe that
the  Chinese  share  the  same  political  values  as  Westerners  and  as  their  closer
neighbours and “compatriots.” It is seen that 84 percent of some 3,183 people surveyed
in China believe that their political regime is already democratic, and that 66 percent
think this democracy will continue to deepen. In other words, the Chinese Communist
Party has succeeded in imposing its own definition of democracy; the Chinese have
almost total  confidence in their institutions,  in particularly the central  institutions,
whether it is the government, the National People’s Congress, the Communist Party,
the army, or the media (over 90 percent). And the least popular institutions (though
still inspiring confidence in 58 percent and 62 percent of respondents) are exactly those
that  the  Americans  and  Europeans  are  banking  on  –  private  enterprises  and  non-
governmental organisations – to promote the concept of democracy in China (p. 229).
The only ray of optimism comes from the close and positive relationship Shi establishes
between education level, age, and urbanisation, on the one hand, and an increase in the
demand for democracy on the other. But for such optimism to prevail, the concept of
democracy as  it  is  almost  universally  understood would first  have to  dethrone the
Chinese-communist  conception  of  this  ideal-type.  And  that  will  be  no  simple  task,
despite the Internet and all the rest…
13 In short, this book is essential reading.
14 Translated by Nick Oates
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